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Conceptual Flaws 
› definitional issues 
› not an offence type  
› sociological, law enforcement, legal definitions 
› law enforcement (organized criminal group) 
› legal (leadership/participation criminal organization) 
› stereotyping 
› often very loosely organized 
› container concept 
› EU criminal law harmonization (history and examples) 
› often legitimation for extraordinary means 
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Pitfalls 
› OC is a construct 
› group crime, requiring different approach? 
› counter-strategies likely, requiring special approach? 
› serious and harmful, requiring prioritized approach? 
› cross-border or transnational character 
› only relevant for demarcation compentency 
› e.g. Europol: impacting on at least 2 states 
› otherwise quite irrelevant or counterproductive 
› cfr 2000 UN TOC Convention + Protocols 
› criminalization even where not transnational 
› int’l cooperation only where transnational 
› selffulfilling prophecies and self-created harm? 
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Challenges 
› why relevant as a concept, if already? 
› knowledge & evidence (type, extent, seriousness etc)? 
› risk 
› 1a. threat (actors, actions) 
› 1b. vulnerabilty (context/environment, sectors) 
› 2. impact/harm (micro/victim, macro/society) 
› readiness for scenario’s (preparedness and resilience) 
› relevance dependent on policy level and phase? 
› law enforcement, general policy making 
› prevention, repression, postvention 
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Knowledge & evidence based approaches 
› about the past 
› situation reporting (national & European) 
› largely selfulfilling 
› based on law enforcement activity and stereotyping 
› no potential to deal with uncertainties or unknown futures 
› = risk in itself 
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Threat & vulnerabity-based risk approaches 
› by or for law enforcement (history EU-methodology > OCTA) 
› what? 
› threat assessment known OC groups 
› frequency, intent, capability 
› context vulnerabilty asessment (PEST) 
› trend identification often selective and intuitive 
› not as useful as in business 
› context less complex & relatively hard and certain 
trends, based on sufficiently reliable & valid data 
› vulnerabilty asessment for OC of economic sectors 
› likeliness & probability-focused 
› calculable predictions and prioritization 
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Harm-based risk approaches (1) 
› South 
› OC (mafia) intrinsically serious and harmful 
› per se LE/policy attention for OC groups & their strategies 
› East 
› interwoven with economy and political decision making 
› per se serious because affecting economy and politics 
› per se LE/policy attention for OC groups & their strategies 
› (quite exclusive) focus on systemic and institutional harm  
› West 
› OC can be serious (multitude of groups and activities) 
› prioritization based on seriousness/harm(fulness) 
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Harm-based risk approaches (2) 
› situation reporting 
› law enforcement, repressive, threat 
› threat & vulnerability assessment 
› more than just law enforecement, repressive but 
primarily (situational) preventative 
› impact/harm asessment 
› victim/population/society, preventative and repressive 
but primarily general policy 
 
    THREAT (actors/activity)  
RISK   VULNERABILITY (context/sectors) 
   HARM (micro/macro)    
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Seriousness as a basis (exit ‘organized’)? 
› Europol mandate evolution 
› from ‘serious OC’ to ‘serious, including OC 
› Eurojust mandate 
› ‘serious, in particular OC’ 
› OCTAs: threat and/or harm? 
› Stockholm Programme & Internal Security Strategy 
› threat & risk: “The concept of internal security must be 
understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which 
straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major 
threats and others which have a direct impact on the lives, 
safety and well-being of citizens, including natural and man-
made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and 
storms” 
› not harm of OC, but of crime types? (any?) 
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Harm-based risk component: Difficulties  
› what is harm(ful)?– what should be calculated as harm? 
› direct harm: physical, economical, psychological, political, 
societal, intellectual, emotional? 
› also indirect harm, e.g. decreased consumer trust due to fraud? 
› also non-victim-related harm, i.e. the reaction cost? 
› only harm & costs? – no benefits? 
› many ‘clients’ got what they wanted 
› reaction cost could be seen as a benefit (employment 
generating) 
› how to measure and compare? 
› what is the available respectively required empirical basis? 
› harm at micro (by a group/person) or macro level (OC in general) or 
both? (Tusikov, 2009) 
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Micro models 
› examples 
› micro risk model (National Policing Improvement Agency) 
› OC group mapping & scoring of harm(fulness) in terms of 
physical damage to society, reputation, politics, capacity, 
cross-border/geographical/economic scale 
› combined with probobility score criminal activities (risk) 
› micro harm model (Metropolitan Police Service) 
› based on potential sanctions for offences by OC groups 
› micro harm model (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada) 
› based on both potential & average sentences duration 
› evaluation 
› added value rather unclear, only useful for LE prioritization 
› very close to ‘traditional’ threat assessments 
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Macro models 
› examples 
› macro cost model (Home Office) 
› macro harm model (ACC) 
› macro risk model comprising a harm component 
(KLPD) 
› general macro risk model comprising a harm 
component (FedPol) 
› evaluation 
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Macro cost model (Home Office) 
› tradition in cost of crime studies, including of OC 
› Dubourg & Prichard, 2007 
› harm expressed in financial cost 
› rather for than by LE agencies 
› economic and social cost (anticipation, consequence and 
reaction) of OC 
› results 
› drugs: 15,4 billion £ 
› tax fraud: 3,7 billion £ 
› fraud: 2,7 billion £ 
› migrant smuggling: 1,4 billion £ 
› THB: 1 billion £ 
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Macro harm model (ACC) 
› Australian Crime Commission (LE body) studies OC threat & the 
harm “of various criminal issues affecting Australian interests” 
› qualitative method, through questioning experts from LE, 
government, industries and academia on political, social and 
economic consequences (vs PEST vulnerability studies) 
› results: “The cost of OC to Australian society is difficult to 
quantify. However, the ACC estimates organised crime costs 
Australia in excess of $10 billion. […] OC affects a broad 
range of sectors and industries in Australia. Often the harm 
from criminal activity is indirect. The consequences of OC 
activity may include increased costs of services or damage to 
the reputation of an industry or institution. More visible 
effects include those from the sale of illicit drugs, theft of 
property or violence” 
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Macro risk model (KLPD) 
› national threat assessment OC (since 2008) 
› combined analysis of vulnerability factors, crime phenomena 
and societal consequences 
› direct societal consequences: health, property, 
environment, infrastructure, decision-makiung processes  
› indirect societal consequences: prevention, harm in 
terms of perception and image etc 
› results 
› harm(ful effects) assessed per crime phenomenon 
› qualitative and non-comparative 
› no ranking 
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General macro risk model (FedPol) 
› annual reports OC (MinJust) primarily threat-based, with 
harm assessment ambition only 
› however, since police reform (over 10y ago): National 
security plan & national police security asessment (FedPol) 
› with ranking of crime phenomena based on multiple 
criteria model relating to extent, perception and impact, 
i.e. organisational scale, complexity and consequences 
› results 
› 1. crimes against physical integrity 
› 2. illicit production and trafficking of drugs 
› 3. traffic accidents with casualties 
› 4. illegal immigration and smuggling of migrants 
 
16 
  
www.ircp.org    Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium    Gert.Vermeulen@UGent.be    T +32 (0)9 264 69 43, F +32 (0)9 264 84 94 
Prof. Dr. G. Vermeulen – Approaching and Counteracting Contemporary Organized Crime – ISDP, Stockholm, 16 November 2011 
Macro models: Evaluation 
› assess the harm(fulness) of OC altogether 
› assuming that OC 
› can be extracted froml ‘all’ crime 
› or largely overlaps/coincides with certain forms of 
identifiable ‘serious’ crime 
› not directly/primarily targeted at law enforcement work 
› rather at general policies 
› largely based on expert assessments 
› illustrative of growing irrelevance of OC concept 
› harm models for crime in general? 
› serious crime as a result? 
› OC as a subresult? 
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Harm-based risk approaches: Conclusion 
› growing attention for OC risk assessment based on 
harm(fulness), but differences 
› micro models: complement traditional threat-based (risk) 
approaches for/by law enforcement 
› macro models: feed general (OC) policies 
› challenge: multi-level harm model, integrating both?  
› Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA, 2010/11) developed  
a harm framework as a common language with other 
partners and useful for evaluation and prioritization of 
operations (against OC groups) and projects 
› at present not capable of prioritizing crime phenomena 
› the end of (analyses on) organized crime? 
› in favour of ‘serious’ crime, simply ‘crime’ or even ‘security’? 
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Scenario-based processes (1) 
› context/environment assessment too static 
› single future, so why even act? 
› future can’t be predicted, but different, uncertain futures can 
be prepared for 
› not focused on crime prevention 
› postvention concerns, precaution and preparedness 
› including in terms of resilience to harm 
› assessment and opmtimizing of recovery and 
adaptation potential 
› comparative overview hereafter 
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Klima, Dorn, Vander Beken, 2010 
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Scenario-based processes (2) 
› usually 5-step approach 
› 1. choose future scenario’s (in casu: (O)C) 
› 2. identify relevant external uncertain factors 
› 3. crossing of 2 relevant uncertainties 
› 4. asess implications of 4 scenario’s + implement 
changes required 
› 5. follow-up and repeat 
› example (Vander Beken, 2005) 
› use of technology by criminal groups? 
› well-organised, technology-led apparatus? 
› 4 scenario’s: Big Brother, Cyber War, Mad Max, Matrix 
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Questions & discussion 
 
